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In 1998, Daimler-Benz bought a highly profitable U.S. automaker—a company enjoying
record sales of light trucks, vans and large sedans. In as few as three years later, Chrysler
was hemorrhaging money. Market capitalization of the combined DaimlerChrysler had not
budged and expected synergies with its new German parent company were nowhere to
be found. “What happened to the dynamic, can-do cowboy culture I bought?” lamented
former Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp.1
What happened, according to numerous observers, amounted to a textbook case of
cultural misalignment. Chrysler had long seen itself as a bold innovator of vehicles for
middle-class Americans and a plucky survivor of four brushes with near-bankruptcy.
(Call it water.) Daimler, by contrast, stood for uncompromising quality and disciplined
German engineering. (Oil, meet water.)
The two companies distrusted one another from the start, to the point that some Daimler
executives publicly vowed that they would never be seen in a Chrysler vehicle. Distrust
likely fueled the business woes that faced the partnership, such as the fierce resistanceIn 1998, Daimler-Benz bought a highly profitable U.S. automaker—a company enjoying
record sales of light trucks, vans and large sedans. In as few as three years later, Chrysler
was hemorrhaging money. Market capitalization of the combined DaimlerChrysler had not
budged and expected synergies with its new German parent company were nowhere to
be found. “What happened to the dynamic, can-do cowboy culture I bought?” lamented
former Daimler CEO Jürgen Schrempp.1
What happened, according to numerous observers, amounted to a textbook case of
cultural misalignment. Chrys ...